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Case No. CV-2013-120 (Custer County, Idaho) 
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PETITIONER I RESPONDENT; 
vs. 
CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED CAUCUS, an Idaho unincorporated nonprofit 
association, and CLARENCE LEUZINGER, an individual, 
RESPONDENTS I APPELLANTS. 
On appeal from the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Custer 
Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge, presiding 
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Submitted by: 
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ARGUMENT1 
In its response brief, Challis narrowly analyzes the evidence and circumstances presented to 
the Court on appeal. Challis focuses only on the fire flow concerns of the existing system in Old 
Town, and the public health and safety impacts of the same. While the Caucus disagrees such an 
immediate concern exists with respect to the existing system, Challis fails to address other aspects 
of the Project that constitute new construction and major improvements. These include new 
construction to the airport area, and new high-tech metering and telemetry. Challis concedes that 
the judiciary cannot substitute itself for the legislative dete1mination that a Project is needed,2 but 
if the legislative determination lacks all of the constitutional requirements of the proviso clause (at 
issue here, "necessity''), then the Court must reject judicial confirmation and send the Project back 
to the legislative body to reconsider what must be done in light of what the Court deems 
unnecessary. That is precisely what the Caucus seeks of this Court- a determination that all aspects 
of the Project are not necessary, that judicial confirmation must be denied, and that the city leaders 
must reconsider what to do (bond election or restructure project based on need). This result is 
supported by both the facts and the law. 
With respect to the material and relevant facts, Challis does not dispute, or argue otherwise, 
that the following facts are applicable -
1. The Project encompasses three principal, and discrete, components - (a) making Old 
Town distribution system improvements, (b) constructing a new airport water line service extension, 
1The Caucus adopts and incorporates herein all argument previously set forth in the Brief 
for the Appellant, filed July 10, 2014. Much of the argument therein is responsive to the 
argument of Respondent, and in the interests of brevity is not restated herein. 
2Respondent's Brief~ at 9-10. 
and (c) upgrading metering and telemetry. R Vol. l, p. 132. 
The Old Town improvement includes replacing 4-inch pipes with larger pipes, 
installing new fire hydrants, looping dead end pipes, installing pressure reduction stations, and 
making associated roadway improvements. R Vol. 1, p. 132. 
3. The airport expansion consists of extending new 6-inch and larger main pipes to the 
airport and installing new fire hydrants. R Vol. 1, p. 132. There is currently no such water service 
at the airport area. 
4. The metering and telemetry upgrade consists of replacing all existing water meters 
in Challis with auto-read equipment, providing software, coordination and training for the auto-read 
system and new accounting system, and upgrading Challis' SCADA system. R Vol. L p. 132. 
As argued previously. and herein. all aspects of the Project are not necessary, and as such 
judicial confirmation is not appropriate. 
The airport expansion clearly constitutes new construction and system expansion. There is 
no dispute that the airport is not currently served by the Challis water system. What Challis wants 
to do is construct new water service to the airport area, an area not historically served by Challis. 
Because there is no water service there at this time, there is certainly no public health or safety 
concern posed by the water service in that area - it does not exist. Challis has no legal obligation to 
provide water service to that area, at least none has been articulated by Challis. City of Boise v. 
Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 6 (2006), made clear a distinction between repair and improvement of existing 
facilities and expansion, or new construction. The former fits within the proviso clause, while the 
latter does not. 
2 
As previously explained by this Court, a permanent courthouse is not a necessary expense 
and thus requires voter approval, while a temporary jail is a necessary expense as it is a stop-gap 
measure while a permanent solution is determined by the people. Citv of Boise, 143 Idaho at 5, 
citing Bannock County v. C. Bunting & Co., 4 Idaho 156 ( 1894 ). Expansion of water service to the 
airport area is both new construction and system expansion. It is a new, permanent facility. It is not 
temporary in nature, designed to fill a gap or urgent need. Expansion is permanent, and as such voter 
input is necessary. 
The Project, at least with respect to airport area expansion, is not truly urgent. There is no 
evidence suggesting that expanding the municipal water service to the airport must be done 
immediately. Rather, it is a matter of convenience, and a desire to expand the service area. While 
some cities accommodate expansion of their municipal water system through growth, with the 
growth paying for the expense, others may choose to expand the system at the expense of the entire 
city. However, resolution of this issue, where public indebtedness is necessary, is not a matter to be 
decided solely by a city council. Our Constitution mandates otherwise. There is no dispute that 
airport expansion has been a topic of frequent city discussion for decades. However, there has been 
no immediate response. This reflects a lack or urgency. Expansion of the municipal water system 
to new areas is an issue deserving of reflection and decision by the informed electorate of the city. 
Challis suggests that the Court continue to employ the Peterson standard for determining 
necessity, rather than factors expressed in Frazier, and subsequent cases.3 According to Challis, the 
Peterson standard explores (I) whether the expense is sought for an ongoing municipal service or 
obligation; (2) whether the expense is sought for repair, or for expansion or something new; (3) 
3Respondent's Brief, at 12. 
3 
whether the existing facility meets current needs of the public; and ( 4) whether the current facility 
is unsafe. See also City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 778-79 ( 1970). These factors apply 
differently to various aspects of the Project proposed by Challis, as reflected by the following matrix, 
where matters tending to lend against "necessity" are shaded in gray. 
CHALLIS 
Old Town Airport Area Metering & 
MUNICIPAL 
WATER SYSTEM 
Improvement Expansion Telemetry 
Is this an ongoing 
Yes as to metering, 
municipal service or Yes No 
no as to telemetry 
obligation? 
Is the expense 
Repair as to 




expansion or new construction 
as to telemetry 
construction? 
Does the existing N/ A - no existing 
No as to metering;5 




Is the current 
Yes6 
NI A - no existing No 
facility unsafe? facility 
The foregoing illustrates that the Project as a whole fails to meet the "necessity" standard as to each 
of its component parts. The airport expansion is clearly not necessary, while only partial aspects of 
the metering and telemetry system can be characterized as necessary. 
4There is no evidence to suggest that public demands upon drinking water are not being 
met. That is, there are no complaints by citizens that when they tum their faucet on, they receive 
no water. 
5The evidence suggests that existing meters are failing and not properly recording water 
use. 
6The Caucus disputes Challis' determination that the current water facility is not safe, but 
for purposes of this matrix it can be assumed as such. 
4 
Given the foregoing, the issue for this Court, clearly, is whether judicial confirmation can be 
granted as to a multi-part project, where only some aspects of the project may be necessary and 
urgent, and other aspects are not. As previously argued, the Caucus submits that the entirety of an 
expense for which public debt will be incurred must meet the standards of the proviso clause in order 
to be allowed by judicial confirmation, and not by public vote. Such a determination is consistent 
with the text and spirit of the Idaho Constitution, and a principled form of democracy. 
The district court should be required to examine and confirm any expense requested by way 
of judicial confirmation as a whole. To do otherwise would be to permit the judiciary to become a 
policy-maker, thereby deciding for a city that it would still want to proceed with a project of which 
only portions can be financed without public approval. This Court ought not put district judges in 
that position. If a significant part7 of a proposed expense is not '·necessary," a district court should 
be required to reject judicial confirmation, and then allow the city leaders to determine how it wishes 
to proceed. Such a result is required in this case. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Caucus reiterates that it is entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal, and for the 
proceedings before the district court. If a petition for judicial confirmation is denied, any interested 
person that appeared to contest the petition is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and 
court costs. IDAHO CODE§§ 7-1313, 12-101. If this Court concludes Challis is not entitled to 
7In this case, of the $3.2 million sought in public indebtedness, over $600,000 (at least 
20%) of the Project will relate to unnecessary airport expansion, and related contingencies, 
design, bidding, supervision, management, and administration. R Vol. 2, pg. 256. This is a 
significant part of the Project. 
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judicial conformation, then the Caucus is entitled to an award ofreasonable attorney fees and court 
costs. 
Challis argues that attorney fees and court costs ought to be assessed against the Caucus for 
bringing this action frivolously and without foundation, and for delaying improvement of the Challis 
water system. The Caucus' argument, both before this Court and the district court, is supported by 
the facts and by current law, including but not limited to the proviso clause, the judicial confirmation 
statutes, and case law interpreting the foregoing. The Caucus has advanced good faith argument for 
its position. 
Challis contends that the Caucus represents a small minority of citizens opposed to public 
funding of the entire Project. This statement is not supported by the evidence in the record. The 
statement further begs the question - if that is the case, and the Caucus represents only a small 
minority, why has Challis fought for judicial confirmation and done everything possible to avoid a 
public vote on the issue, despite the passage of more than four years of consideration of the Project. 
Challis further contends that the Caucus has placed the public at unnecessary risk by seeking 
judicial confirmation and pursuing an appeal. This statement is without merit. The judicial 
confirmation law expressly grants citizens the right to oppose requests for judicial confirmation. The 
Caucus has merely utilized its statutory, and constitutional, rights. Moreover, the judicial 
confirmation law allows for an appeal to this Court. Nothing requires, however, that the district 
court's decision is stayed pending this Court's review, and the Caucus sought no such relief. If the 
Project was a pressing and immediate public concern, one must assume Challis would have 
proceeded in reliance on the enforceable district court opinion. Even more telling, Challis has not 
sought any expedited review of this action, as may be allowed by I.AR. 44 and Idaho Code § 7-
6 
1310.8 Again, ifthere was such an immediate need to proceed with the Project, one would have to 
assume Challis would be seeking expedited review. It has not. The Caucus cannot be blamed for 
delay in proceeding with the Project - that is a knowing decision of Challis that reveals volumes as 
to the urgency of the Project. 
The Caucus has done nothing but exercise rights extended to it under the Idaho Constitution, 
Idaho statutes, and applicable rules of procedure, all supported by facts not in dispute and by existing 
law, or a good faith argument as to modification of existing law. As such, in any event, the Caucus 
ought not be required to pay any fees or costs of Challis, and the opposite ought to be required. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for those reasons previously articulated in the Brie/for the 
Appellant, filed July 10, 2014, the Caucus respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE the 
district court's determination that judicial confirmation is appropriate and, alternatively, determine 
that judicial confirmation is not appropriate under the circumstances of this action. The Caucus 
further requests an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal, and requests that this matter be 
REMANDED to the district court for entry of a judgment dismissing Challis' petition and for entry 
of a judgment awarding the Caucus costs and attorney fees incurred in the district court proceedings. 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
David P. Claiborne 
81.C. 7-1310(3) requires that proceedings regarding the validity of judicial confirmation 
"shall be advanced as a matter of immediate public interest and concern, and be heard at the 
earliest practicable time." 
7 
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